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DIGNIFYING RIGHTS: A COMMENT ON 
JEREMY WALDRON’S DIGNITY,  RIGHTS,  
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Katherine Franke* 
In Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities1 Jeremy Waldron offers a 
characteristically thoughtful and elegant account of rights, or as he calls it, 
responsibility-rights. As Waldron rightfully acknowledges, rights 
understood as a form of responsibility are not meant to capture every 
species of rights, but to provide us with a new analytic resource for better 
understanding a particular subset of rights that curiously entail a form of 
responsibility on the part of the rights holder. The link between rights and 
responsibility, Waldron argues, is built upon a strong foundational 
commitment to human dignity. The most compelling contribution of 
Waldron’s paper is his careful unbraiding of the complex relationship of 
rights, responsibility, and a liberal conception of human dignity.  
This new work on responsibility-rights should be seen as a part with 
Waldron’s other recent writing elaborating a robust conception of human 
dignity based not on the inherent moral worth of each human person, but 
rather on a notion of status or rank. “[T]he modern notion of human dignity 
involves an upwards equalization of rank,”2 Waldron tells us in his 2009 
Tanner Lecture, “[W]e now try to accord to every human being something 
of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded 
to nobility.”3 In this new Shoen Lecture, Waldron urges us to consider how 
rights are either founded upon or expressive of the value of human dignity.  
My aim in this response-essay is to consider more deeply the 
implications of an account of rights that is premised upon an aristocratic 
conception of human dignity.4 Specifically, I am interested in the way in 
which responsibility is not merely a symptom or correlate of a certain set of 
                                                                                                                       
*. Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Gender 
& Sexuality Law, Columbia University. © 2011 by Katherine Franke. A portion of this essay 
derives from a lecture given at the Chautauqua Institution. 
1. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2012). 
2. See Waldron’s Tanner Lectures “Dignity and Rank” and “Law, Dignity, and Self-
Control” in Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC 
Berkeley 29 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1461220. 
3. Id.  
4. Waldron describes dignity as a “quintessentially aristocratic virtue.”  Id. at 43.  
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rights understood as responsibility-rights, but in how behaving responsibly 
is expected of those who aim to have their rights claims recognized by 
others. In this sense, possessing dignity is not inherent in one’s identity as 
human, but rather takes work, a kind of work that Waldron describes as “the 
voluntary self-application of norms.”5 That work can be understood as 
preparatory for a scene then to follow. Only once others, dignified others, 
recognize that this virtuous work has been done, can one “be dignified,” just 
as one might “be beatified.” Dignity in this sense is not something one 
simply has, but rather is earned through hard work on the self, and is fully 
settled only once it has been recognized by another.  
It is these two aspects of the responsibility-dignity-rights loop that I want 
to press in this essay: First, dignity is an accomplishment, a normative 
practice which requires work. It is something you can, indeed must, earn 
and can risk losing. There is a self-mastery implicit in, yet essential to an 
entitlement to the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that were 
formerly accorded only to nobility. This first step I’ll call recognizability. It 
precedes the second essential component, without which, neither dignity nor 
the rights claims that are its expression, can come off: recognition. The 
emergence of dignity is always given over to others to recognize dignity in 
another. In this sense, dignity is accomplished more relationally than 
ontologically, according to a set of norms that facilitate that recognition, 
and are administered by a range of social, legal, and political institutions.  
The claims of same-sex couples to a right to civil marriage offer a cogent 
example of how this two-step process works. The lesbian and gay 
community understood that it had reputational work to do to ready itself for 
the successful presentation of rights claim to legislatures and courts. In this 
sense, recognizabililty preceded recognition. Yet this example also teaches 
us how notions of dignity and responsibility-rights come at a price. At least 
in this context, they provide a less than satisfactory predicate for legal-
citizenship.6 
* * * 
Waldron’s elegant account of human dignity, upon which his notion of 
responsibility-rights derives, seeks to steer clear of anchorage in the wholly 
theological, as does Robert George or Pope John Paul II, or in the more 
general notion of the sacred, as does Kant. Instead he prefers a more liberal, 
                                                                                                                       
5. Id. at 47. 
6. In the Second Tanner Lecture Waldron tells us that “[i]f I were to give a name the 
status I have in mind, the high rank or dignity attributed to every member of the community and 
associated with their fundamental rights, I might choose the term ‘legal citizenship.’” Id. at 56 
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though oddly aristocratic, notion of rank or status to capture the “special 
something” that is human dignity. Grounding the analysis, at first, in 
etymology, Waldron traces the term dignity back to its Roman then early 
English roots.7 The genealogy teaches us that early uses of the term dignitas 
“embodied the idea of the honor, the privileges and the deference due to 
rank or office.”8 Modernizing the notion in liberal terms, Waldron preserves 
the dignity that derives from rank or status while flattening out the 
hierarchies among humans sorted traditionally by rank, nobility, or royalty. 
All humans, as a consequence of this move, enjoy an upwards equalization 
of rank akin to the status enjoyed by those who formally sat atop the human 
ladder. He finds inspiration for this move in the underappreciated work of 
Gregory Vlastos: “[W]e organize ourselves not like a society without 
nobility or rank, but like an aristocratic society which has just one rank (and 
a pretty high rank at that) for all of us.”9  
Reading this, I am struck by a number of puzzles: How, one might 
wonder, can rank that does no meaningful sorting (since it is “rank” among 
equals) retain the “special something” that inheres in dignity, a virtue that 
was previously awarded only to those with the highest status, thereby 
setting them apart from their depraved and sorry inferiors? Doesn’t the idea 
of rank or status depend upon things to be ranked or sorted according to 
some standard of value? Rank survives as the structure or container, if you 
will, for human dignity, but how so? How can the virtue/value that was 
distributed on the basis of ranking in pre-modern, non-liberal societies 
retain value once we have announced that all comparison or differentiation 
among humans must end?  
Waldron, I believe, addresses these questions by preserving hierarchy 
not among humans, but between humans and other animals. While the point 
is not fully developed or defended in the Shoen or the Tanner Lectures, it is 
quite clear that Waldron regards humans of the highest moral order, capable 
of reason, self-control, voluntary conformance to a norm, and willful 
uprightness of bearing. This “uprightness of bearing” Waldron cleverly 
terms “a sort of moral orthopedics associated with rights,”10 but it could just 
as easily be understood as evolutionary in nature, gesturing in the direction 
of a differentiation between man and ape, human and animal.11 This idea is 
                                                                                                                       
7. Waldron, supra note 1, at 11. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted) (citing Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in 
THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (1962)). 
10. Id. at 18. 
11. Giorgio Agamben would offer a different contrast, that of the dignified human and the 
Muselmänner—the walking dead of the camps. “The Muselmann is not only or not so much a 
limit between life and death; rather, he marks the threshold between the human and the 
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one of the principle aims in the closing lines of the Tanner Lectures, 
wherein he defends an aristocratic, albeit egalitarian, conception of rank that 
is to be distinguished from being treated like an animal: 
This is what reactionaries always say: if we abolish distinctions of 
rank, we will end up treating everyone like an animal, “and an 
animal not of the highest order.” But the ethos of human dignity 
reminds us that there is an alternative: we can flatten out the scale 
of status and rank and leave Marie Antoinette more or less where 
she is. Everyone can eat cake . . . .12  
In this way, rank is able to retain its elevating virtue insofar as the capacity 
for dignity is something that sets humans apart from and above other 
inferior species of animals. 
The anthro-centric and aristocratic roots of the Waldronian account of 
dignity as rank are not where I want to dwell. Instead, I prefer to press 
elsewhere: on the relation of dignity to role. For Waldron, dignity emerges 
or is revealed in one’s performance of a role:  
[O]ne might speak of the dignity of a clergyman, such as a bishop, 
in terms of his responsibility for the administration of a diocese, or 
even . . . the dignity of a rector, in terms of his elementary right to 
administer the sacraments (or direct their administration) in a 
particular parish.13  
Extending the clergical analogy to the rest of us, it seems that dignity 
isn’t something that one simply has by virtue of being a human (and not an 
animal or a dilapidated house14) but is something one earns, or better yet, 
                                                                                                                       
inhuman,” Agamben writes. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, REMNANTS OF AUSCHWITZ: THE WITNESS AND 
THE ARCHIVE 55 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Zone Books 2008) (1999). “The Muselmann has 
. . . moved into a zone of the human where not only help but also dignity and self-respect have 
become useless.” Id. at 63. Relying on Primo Levi’s account of life in the camps in The 
Drowned and the Saved (1988), the Muselmänner are characterized by their stooped manner and 
their absence of walking upright. Id. at 157. Their enstoopification and degradation are 
accomplished by the biopolitical project of the camps, resulting in the complete evacuation of 
their humanity and their dignity, characterized by, as Agamben calls it, a bare life. Id. at 69. 
Curiously, Agamben connects humanity to responsibility, but to different effect than does 
Waldron, “[the survivor] knows that humanity and responsibility are something that the 
deportee had to abandon when entering the camp.” Id. at 59–60. 
12. Waldron, supra note 4, at 33. Elsewhere he tells us in connection with the law of 
torture: “People . . . will not be herded like cattle or broken like horses; they will not be beaten 
like dumb animals or treated as bodies to be manipulated . . . . [Legal] force and coercion do not 
work by reducing [persons] to a quivering mass of bestial, desperate terror.” Jeremy Waldron, 
Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 
1726–27 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13. Waldron, supra note 1, at 13. 
14. Waldron uses this term in the Tanner Lecture. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 45. 
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works at. We are to be treated like a Duke not by dint of letters patent or 
hereditary entitlement but because of individual desert. As such, 
responsibility doesn’t come into the picture once rights have been 
recognized (such as the right to parental custody and control of a child 
entailing a duty to exercise that control responsibility); rather dignity is to 
be found in the responsible performance of one’s role, as parent, as citizen, 
as clergy, or as soldier. Waldron illustrates this notion by reference to Max 
Weber’s conception of politics as vocation, that the politician or statesman 
assumes a “personal responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he 
cannot and must not reject or transfer.”15 What is true for the public servant 
and political leader, Waldron argues, holds equally true for the ordinary 
citizen.16 Rights entail responsibilities, but more than that I want to suggest, 
a rights claim will not be seriously entertained if one has not comported 
oneself in a responsible manner as an antecedent to asserting the claim 
itself. This may even be understood as a rule of standing: Those who are 
irresponsible, undignified, (or dare I say beastly?), have no standing to 
make rights claims.  
The notion that dignity entails a convincing performance of 
responsibility is in evidence when Waldron tells us:  
When we hear the claim that someone has dignity, what comes to 
mind are ideas such as: having a certain sort of presence; 
uprightness of bearing; self-possession and self-control; self-
presentation as someone to be reckoned with; not being abject, 
pitiable, distressed or overly submissive in circumstances of 
adversity.17  
As we can see from this description, this work is thickly norm-driven and, 
at bottom, social in nature. In a sense, the body is “exposed to social 
crafting and form,” and is “exposed to socially and politically articulated 
forces as well as to the claims of sociality—including language, work and 
desire.”18 This last notion, desire, is particularly intriguing insofar as it is 
worth considering how the performance I am describing is motivated, in 
significant part, by a desire to enact, or better yet, embody a social norm.  
The performative nature of dignity, that it requires work, is the first point 
that I want to press in this essay, and I will return to it in due course when I 
                                                                                                                       
15. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 95 
(H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958). 
16. Waldron, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
17. Id. at 11. 
18. JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN IS LIFE GRIEVABLE? 3 (2009). Butler offers 
this analysis in connection with the conditions of human precariousness, but they are useful in 
illuminating the nature of structure of dignity as well. 
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situate the critique in the same-sex marriage cases. My second point has to 
do with the relational rather than ontological nature of dignity. On this I 
may get no disagreement from Waldron, but the point deserves greater 
elaboration than he was able to give in his Shoen lecture. For Hegel, 
particularly according to Kojéve’s reading,19 dignity, indeed the notion of 
the human itself, is an intersubjective enterprise. It does not arise 
intrinsically in the nature of the human being, or out of some mystical form 
of elevation or lifting up, nor is the performance of role in a dignified 
manner self-executing.20 Rather, human dignity is accomplished, if you will, 
in the moment of recognition of the self by others. Hegel’s focus is on the 
bondsman’s recognition of the master, but the productive potential of the 
act of intersubjective recognition applies to all subjects, regardless of their 
rank or status relative to one another.21 
We find the fingerprints of Hegel’s interest in recognition in Waldron’s 
paper, insofar as he acknowledges that dignity is no dignity at all if it is not 
respected by others, and most importantly not recognized and respected by 
the law and legal authority. Pushing the argument a bit further, one way to 
understand what is going on when a person makes a rights claim is that they 
are making a plea to be recognized by legal authority in a particular way: as 
a being equal in rank to other dignified humans. What is sought is a kind of 
solidarity or fraternity entailed in recognition, uplifting, elevating, or even 
dignifying the disfavored party by announcing that a comparison or 
differentiation must cease. Dignity results from “a performance of solidarity 
through the foreclosure of negative valuation.”22 What is being recognized 
in a moment of this sort is the rights-bearing status of the individual so 
pleading. Thus dignity is conferred as a consequence of, not predicate for, 
this moment of uptake, this act of intersubjective recognition, which 
operates according to a set of norms that facilitate and make possible that 
recognition.  
Curiously, in law human dignity is observed most often in the breach.23 
Rather than extol the qualities of the dignified life in the case of dignified 
human flourishing, courts more regularly find the opportunity to chart 
dignity’s contours when it has been lost or diminished in a particular case. 
                                                                                                                       
19. ALEXANDRE KOJÉVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL 3 (Allan Bloom ed., 
James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1969) (1947). 
20. Id. at 7. 
21. Id. 
22. Stephen Riley, Observing the Breach: Dignity and the Limits of Political Theology, 19 
LAW & CRITIQUE 115, 136 (2008). 
23. Id. at 125. 
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Thus it is worth noting that in the precincts of law, dignity’s absence is 
typically more palpable than its presence.  
By examining the moments of breach, rather than starting from the point 
of dignity fulfilled, as does Waldron, one learns different things about the 
relationship of dignity to responsibility to rights. When the claim for breach 
is being made the performative nature of human dignity, and the recognition 
of rights that flows there from, are foregrounded. 
Consider gay-rights litigation in the U.S. over the last quarter century. 
The project at hand has increasingly become redemptive in nature. Only 
when the disfavored, lower-caste group has been able to convincingly prove 
that a category mistake has been made, and that indeed they are as 
responsible as the higher caste, will their claim to rights-bearing status be 
recognized. This project is not something that can take place overnight. 
Rather it requires time. What’s more, it requires work. The misunderstood 
group must mount ritualized, repeated performances of responsibilized 
citizenship designed, over time, to convince a court, a legislature, the 
public, and to some degree themselves, that they have put their errant ways 
behind them and/or that they have been horribly misunderstood. Substantial 
numbers of lesbian and gay people have had to build lives, indeed lives on 
view for the rest of the society to witness, characterized by commitment, 
monogamy, parenting, moderation, and conformance with gender norms. 
It’s respectability that we’re really talking about here.  
Institutional politics take place next. Lawsuits are filed, bills are 
introduced into state legislatures, and political action campaigns are 
launched. The testimony in the litigation, the witnesses before the 
legislatures, and the ad campaigns that run on television try to retell the 
story of who we are, and of how we have been misunderstood, always 
through a convincing portrayal of responsibility and respectability.  
In these efforts to recount the story of a group’s “true nature,” plot helps. 
Indeed, emplotment is usually the trick of the trade: boy is bullied by other 
kids at school, boy tries to conform, boy comes out to himself, then to his 
parents, who reject him. Boy meets another boy like him, boy falls in love 
with other boy, boy settles down with other boy, adopts kids with other boy, 
goes to church, coaches little league, collects stamps. Boy wants to marry 
other boy but can’t. Boy yearns that when he can finally marry other boy his 
parents will accept him and so will society. The plot inevitably arcs toward 
a happy ending, and the project is to keep the story a romance rather than a 
tragedy, characterized by redemption (sometimes even atonement) rather 
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than censure or reproof. Thus we see a litigation narrative characterized by 
“language, work, and desire” as Butler suggested.24  
My aim in locating dignity and rights within a narrative, in portraying 
them as diachronic rather than synchronic in nature, is to illustrate how the 
foundational relationship between responsibility-rights and dignity as told 
by Waldron doesn’t work in the same way for all rights-based claims. By 
this I don’t mean to misunderstand him to be providing an analytic frame 
for all rights claims, but rather I hope to offer a more complex account of 
the sub-set of rights claims that are tethered to responsibility and that are in 
important ways launched by an appeal to human dignity. I’ll unpack this 
particular concern after walking through the example of the same-sex 
marriage litigation. 
* * * 
In the summer of 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of 
California declared that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.25 Prop 8, or the 
California Marriage Protection Act,26 changed the California Constitution to 
define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, and was 
intended to undo a ruling from the California Supreme Court that had found 
that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry.27 Judge Walker’s 
decision signals, to my mind, a rather significant shift in the nature of civil 
rights claims in this country away from the kinds of reasons that were given 
when African Americans and women first started winning civil rights cases 
in the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s.  
What we see in a number of the same-sex marriage cases around the 
country, but surely in the Prop 8 case, is a revival of the legal importance of 
dignity, indeed two different conceptions of dignity. These cases turn, on 
the one hand, on the inherent dignity of human beings, and on the other, on 
the dignity of the institution of marriage and the relationships that deserve 
the blessing of the marital form. Waldron’s notion of dignity, rights, and 
responsibilities is in many respects consonant with the thinking underlying 
the wins in the same-sex marriage context. 
The tone, the ethical stakes, and the turn to values in these cases is really 
quite different from what we, as civil rights lawyers, had come to expect 
from the reasoning in the sex and race cases over the past half century. 
You’ve got to admit that it’s kind of ironic that morality has come to the 
                                                                                                                       
24. Butler, supra note 18. 
25. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
26. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
27. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). 
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rescue of homosexuals in the last few years, when morality has been, since 
Leviticus, the justification for the condemnation, criminalization, 
stigmatization, and in many cases violence meted out against gay men and 
lesbians in almost all precincts of the globe.  
So let me back up for a moment and sketch out what I understand to 
have been the ethical frame within which a notion of race and sex-based 
justice has been spelled out by the Supreme Court in the modern era. 
Starting with the racial equality cases in the 1950s, for the most part the 
Supreme Court’s approach to group-based fairness has been Aristotelian in 
nature. Recall that for Aristotle injustice lay in treating similarly situated 
classes dissimilarly. The starting point for Aristotle and for the courts in 
cases where unjust or unequal treatment is alleged is to ask whether the 
disfavored group is substantially similar to the favored group. For example, 
are thirsty black people and thirsty white people substantially similar in 
their desire to quench their thirst from a drinking fountain? If so, then 
separate drinking fountains violate an Aristotelian norm of treating like 
things alike. This approach was stated most clearly by Justice John Harlan 
in 1896 when he said: “Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows 
nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens 
are equal before the law.”28 He was well ahead of his time when he wrote 
this in the late nineteenth century, but by the middle of the twentieth 
century his formulation of legal fairness had been embraced as the dominant 
view by virtually all U. S. courts.  
This approach called “Color-Blind Constitutionalism” came to be 
applied by the courts in a fairly mechanical or formal way. It’s a simple 
concept and it went like this: the Constitution prohibits the sorting of people 
on the basis of their race. Period. The reasons for the sorting are irrelevant, 
as race-conscious policies are presumptively illegitimate. Imagine the kinds 
of situations they had in mind in the early to mid twentieth century—mostly 
Jim Crow policies segregating blacks from whites. All of these were illegal 
under a color-blind rule because it was assumed that any racial distinction 
was motivated by a notion of racial inferiority of black people. But what 
about policies that took race into account in order to address and remediate 
historical racial injustice, such as affirmative action? Since color-blind 
constitutionalism was uninterested in benign or good reasons why people 
were being treated differently on the basis of their race, affirmative action 
policies have had a hard time in the courts. Taking race into account for any 
reason was illegitimate—like things must be treated alike. This injunction 
                                                                                                                       
28. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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against race-based sorting enacts Waldron’s “equal rank” notion of 
humanity. 
As the Court’s jurisprudence on racial equality developed over time, the 
question of why racial thinking was wrong, or even the immorality of 
racism itself, garnered very little attention. That sort of thick discussion of 
morality was not relevant to the legal inquiry. Instead, the question to be 
considered was whether a formal legal rule requiring color-blindness had 
been violated. 
In the 1970s, the women’s rights movement turned to the courts to 
challenge policies that disfavored women. To succeed they echoed the kinds 
of reasoning that had been adopted in the race cases.29 Legal formalism 
dominated the Court’s jurisprudence in the sex discrimination cases just as 
it had in the race discrimination cases. The argument went like this: women 
were, for the most part, similarly situated to men and could not be legally 
treated differently from men. A kind of sex-blind constitutionalism was 
quickly brought to bear on the sex discrimination claims of this period. Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, a women’s rights lawyer with the ACLU in the 1970s, was 
the primary architect of the sex-blind approach. (Of course pregnancy poses 
a difficult problem for this line of thinking, but I’ll leave that issue for 
another essay.) 
Just as in the race cases, over the last half century the Supreme Court has 
largely committed itself to a mechanical approach to fairness in the race and 
sex cases. When the Virginia Military Institute, a men’s military college, 
was sued by several young women who were denied admission, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, then a Justice of the Supreme Court, noted that VMI’s mission 
was to produce “citizen soldiers . . . imbued with love of learning, confident 
in the functions and attitudes of leadership, [and who wanted to be] 
advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system, . . . ready 
to defend their country in time of national peril.”30 She found for the Court 
that men and women were similarly situated and equally qualified to 
achieve this goal:  
Surely that goal is great enough to accommodate women, who 
today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in 
stature to men. Just as surely, the Commonwealth’s great goal is 
not substantially advanced by women's categorical exclusion, in 
                                                                                                                       
29. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
30. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996) (quoting VMI BD. OF VISITORS, 
MISSION STUDY COMM. REPORT (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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total disregard of their individual merit, from the Commonwealth's 
premier “citizen-soldier” corps.31 
Thus the Supreme Court has opted to ground its reasoning in the race 
and sex cases in a kind of dispassion toward the matter, instead of offering 
strong moral condemnation of racism, sexism, and the like. To the extent 
that there is a value at stake, it is the value of neutrality. As a moral 
ambition, it’s pretty hard to get all riled up about neutrality.  
But when it comes to the rights of gay people, the Supreme Court has 
had no trouble getting all moral and all riled up. Moralizing did almost all 
the work in the Court’s first significant engagement with gay rights in 1986. 
The case, Bowers v. Hardwick, was a challenge to the Georgia sodomy 
law.32 An Atlanta Police officer had come to Michael Hardwick’s house to 
serve a summons on him for throwing out a beer bottle in the wrong bin 
outside of a bar.33 The officer was let into the house by a roommate and 
found Hardwick in his bedroom in the embraces of another man.34 He 
arrested Hardwick then and there for violating the Georgia sodomy law.35 
The ACLU had been waiting for years for a case like this to raise the 
privacy rights of gay men and lesbians, and these facts seemed perfect.   
But the Supreme Court did not see it the same way as the ACLU. Justice 
Byron White, who wrote the majority opinion, treated the case as no 
different from an arrest for viewing child pornography—the conduct is 
deplorable and the fact that it took place in a private home should make no 
difference when it comes to the legitimacy of a law that makes it criminal.36 
He wrote for the Court: “Against this background, to claim that a right to 
engage in such conduct is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is, at best, facetious. 
. . . Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized 
whenever it occurs in the home.”37 In his view, the Constitution creates no 
grounds to invalidate laws based in public morality, and if the people of 
Georgia think homosexuality is immoral it is within their right to 
criminalize it. Chief Justice Burger went even further, writing that the 
condemnation of homosexuality is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral 
                                                                                                                       
31. Id. at 545–46. 
32. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
33. JANET R. JAKOBSEN & ANN PELLEGRINI, LOVE THE SIN: SEXUAL REGULATION AND THE 
LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 24 (2003). 
34. ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: CASES LOST AND CAUSES WON BEFORE 
THE SUPREME COURT 48 (2006). 
35. Id.  
36. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195. 
37. Id. at 194–95. 
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and ethical teaching.38 After all, he noted, the Romans punished 
homosexuals with the death penalty, and legal codes during the English 
Reformation described sodomy as a “crime against nature,” and an “offense 
of ‘deeper malignity’ than rape.”39 The act was considered so heinous that 
“the very mention of it was a ‘disgrace to human nature.’”40 The very 
mention of it.  
Michael Hardwick lost his case in the Supreme Court partly because a 
majority of the Court viewed homosexuality with disgust. Court observers 
at the time were also quick to point out that more than the rights of gay 
people were at stake in the case. Then, as now, whenever a constitutional 
right to privacy was in play, Roe v. Wade41 and the issue of abortion were 
not far from people’s minds. The Court’s treatment of Hardwick’s privacy 
claim signaled a reluctance to recognize a general constitutional right to 
privacy or to extend such a right any further than they already had. For this 
reason Justice White insisted in his opinion in Bowers:  
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in the 
[reproductive rights] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed 
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy . . 
. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the 
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been 
demonstrated.42  
The Bowers decision was a devastating blow to the young gay rights 
movement. I remember the day it was announced. I had just graduated from 
law school and was sitting in my kitchen in San Francisco studying for the 
California bar when I heard the news come in on the radio. I wondered what 
profession I was about to enter where the Chief Justice of our highest court 
thought the very mention of homosexuality was a disgrace to human kind.  
The Bowers decision positioned the United States as an outlier among 
our peers in the developed world. Just as the Supreme Court endorsed the 
criminalization of homosexuality in such ugly terms, other jurisdictions 
such as the European Union and South Africa were not only decriminalizing 
homosexuality but also extending affirmative constitutional protections to 
gay people.43 Bowers v. Hardwick44 quickly became an embarrassment for 
                                                                                                                       
38. Id. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
39. Id. at 197 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215). 
40. Id. 
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
42. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190–91. 
43. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1981); Nat’l Coal. for Gay and 
Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
44. 478 U.S. 186. 
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the Supreme Court, and Justice Powell, who had been the deciding vote in 
the case, told a small group of law students shortly thereafter that he wished 
he had voted with the dissent.45  
The defeat that was the Supreme Court decision in Bowers helps us 
understand something important, and under-explored by Waldron in the 
Shoen lecture, about the relationship of rights to dignity. If you were a gay 
or lesbian person living in the United States in 1986, you felt something 
more than that the Supreme Court had made a terrible mistake. The Court’s 
decision was not merely something untruthful or unkind being said about 
us, it actually did something to us. It is hard to imagine a more devastating 
way in which to have the dignity of a group renounced than to be described 
as a disgrace to human kind. But it did more than deny us the dignity we 
sought in bringing the case. It shamed us and it ranked us as something less 
than heterosexual people. In this sense, the denial of rights was 
performative, particularly when done as spectacularly as in Bowers. It 
accomplished a form of degradation, and in so doing pulled off the creation 
of caste—lower (homo) and higher (hetero) caste.  
But sometimes losing a case, and losing it so stunningly, can galvanize 
political action to take another run at the problem. The night the decision 
was announced I joined hundreds, likely thousands of protesters on the 
streets of San Francisco outraged at having been punched in the face by the 
Supreme Court. We understood that we had work to do. We had not made 
ourselves recognizable to the public and to legal authority as a community 
worthy of full constitutional protection and the dignity that recognition 
would confer. 
So that work began. On school boards, on little league fields, at PTA 
meetings, in churches, in workplaces, grocery stores—everywhere. We set 
out to demonstrate in fora both quotidian and extraordinary that we were 
not a perverse Other, that we were respectable citizens, that we were just 
like you. It is important to understand the turn this work took. The project 
was not one of sexual liberation, as had been the approach of the early 
Stonewall activists, of “live and let live,” or “keep your laws off our 
bodies.” This was not a politics of neutrality or sexual liberty, nor did it 
echo the liberal kinds of arguments made by H.L.A. Hart in his debates with 
Lord Patrick Devlin about the legitimacy of criminalizing sodomy.46 Rather 
                                                                                                                       
45. Anand Agneshwar, Powell On Sodomy; Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, 
NAT’L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3, col. 1.  
46. Hart’s view turned on the application of the harm principle: if no one is harmed by the 
practice the state has no legitimate reason to regulate or criminalize it. H.L.A. Hart, Immorality 
and Treason, THE LISTENER (BBC), July 3, 1959, at 162–63; LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). 
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the gay politics of the 1990s took a decidedly normative turn in favor of 
demonstrating to a skeptical American public that we were normal, 
respectable, and responsible citizens, not the perverts that Chief Justice 
Burger had described in Bowers. In short, the shame of Bowers was met 
with a politics of redemption.  
Little by little, this work paid off and the wrongness of Bowers became 
unbearable to the Court. Seventeen years later (a short period of time in the 
history of the Supreme Court) the issue returned to the high court in 
Lawrence v. Texas,47 raising very similar facts to the Bowers case: two men 
arrested for having sex in the privacy of their own home.48 This time, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, wrote for a slim, one-vote majority and found 
that indeed there is a constitutional problem with criminalizing sex between 
consenting adults in private. But he did so in a curious way, by reframing 
the question not as about a right to sex but as about a right to a relationship 
with the person of your choosing.  
Justice White in Bowers had rejected any connection between 
homosexuality and family, marriage or procreation, but Justice Kennedy 
sutured these domains back together, seeing the rights at issue in Lawrence 
as analogous to those enjoyed by heterosexual people: all people, regardless 
of their sexual orientation have a liberty right to form a personal, intimate 
relationship with another consenting adult, regardless of that person’s sex.49  
If Justice Kennedy had stopped there, Lawrence would have established 
a kind of “sexual orientation-blind” rule similar to the color-blind rule in the 
race cases. In fact, that approach is exactly how Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor approached the issue in Lawrence in her concurrence in the 
case.50 But she couldn’t get anyone else on the Court to join her in this 
reasoning, so she wrote only for herself. Justice Kennedy’s majority, by 
contrast, rejected a mere neutrality rule when it came to criminalizing 
certain kinds of sex, and rested the outcome on a strong moral account of 
the essential worth of people who just happen to be homosexual.51  
He wrote that the Texas statute “demeans the lives of homosexual 
persons,” they “are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their 
private sexual conduct a crime.”52 He then repeated soaring language that 
had been used in an earlier abortion rights case: “At the heart of liberty is 
                                                                                                                       
47. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
48. Id. at 562–63.  
49. Id. at 566. 
50. Id. at 578. 
51. Id. at 567. 
52. Id. at 578. 
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the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”53  
I have to confess that many of us, in reading the opinion, were surprised 
that sodomy laws were found to violate the “sweet mystery of life” rule.  
The Lawrence case signaled an important and new direction that the 
courts would take in interpreting the constitutional rights of gay people as 
compared with African Americans and women. The moralizing of Bowers 
that left a homosexual minority vulnerable to the disgust and judgment of 
the majority was not replaced in Lawrence with a rule requiring the equal 
treatment of similarly situated persons when it comes to their intimate lives. 
Rather, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy gave the boot to Justice White’s and 
Burger’s strong negative moral vision by substituting his own moral 
reasoning grounded in an almost spiritual reverence for the dignity of the 
human and a call that the law respect the most intimate choices each person 
makes about the meaning of their lives. In a somewhat surprising turn of 
events, the gay rights cases were starting to share a greater similarity with 
the abortion and reproductive autonomy cases than the cases recognizing 
the civil rights of African Americans and women. 
Part of what made this shift possible was a complete reconceptualization 
by the Supreme Court of what these cases were about. The Bowers court 
treated Michael Hardwick’s claim as about a constitutional right to 
sodomy—a kind of non-normative sex—and found this an easy thing to 
dismiss. But when the Lawrence Court took up the issue, sex dropped out of 
the picture entirely. Dignity and respect of intimate relationships took its 
place. This required that Justice Kennedy frame the facts of the case in 
terms that were consonant with the larger normative project of 
respectability, but may not have actually been true.54 What is important is 
that the Supreme Court was willing to welcome lesbian and gay people into 
the community of rights-bearing citizens not because of the sex we have, 
                                                                                                                       
53. Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
54. Justice Kennedy’s finding in Lawrence that the Texas sodomy law violated a 
fundamental liberty right was premised upon a story he made up about Lawrence and Gardner 
being in a relationship in which their interactions allowed them to elaborate their “concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Dale Carpenter’s 
work on the backstory of this “relationship” tells a quite different tale. See Dale Carpenter, The 
Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464 (2004). Carpenter’s 
description of Lawrence and Garner’s “relationship” is quite different from that portrayed by 
Kennedy’s opinion. The two men, Lawrence (white) and Garner (black), were not in a 
relationship, but were more likely occasional sex partners. Id. at 1478. The night of the arrest 
another sex partner of Garner’s called the police to report that “a black  male was going crazy” 
in Lawrence’s apartment “and he was armed with a gun.” (Carpenter notes that a racial epithet 
rather than “black man” was probably the term used.) Id. at 1479. The police arrived at the 
apartment and found Lawrence and Garner having sex. Id. at 1480. 
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but rather because of the “enduring personal bonds” we seek—bonds that 
gain constitutional protection for reasons that are not squarely or even 
obliquely about sex. Criminal sodomy laws could be understood as an 
affront to “personal dignity and autonomy”55 because gay people had a 
“right to demand respect” for their relationships “just as heterosexual 
persons do.”56 
So, you might be thinking, what’s wrong with a turn toward dignity? 
Well, to understand how dignity is a complex value in which to anchor 
civil rights claims we have to look no further than the same-sex marriage 
cases that were filed on the heels of the Lawrence decision. Indiana came 
first. An appellate court dismissed a lawsuit challenging the state’s 
heterosexuals-only marriage law on the grounds that since only 
heterosexual couples can become accidentally pregnant they need the 
structure and responsibility of the institution of marriage so that the children 
of these accidents aren’t harmed by their parents’ irresponsible 
reproduction.57 Gay couples, on the other hand, do not get pregnant by 
accident. Rather they have to do a lot of work to have children: adopting, 
using insemination or surrogacy services, or other deliberate means. As 
such they are likely to be much more responsible reproducers, thereby not 
needing the institution of marriage to shore up otherwise weak family 
structure.  
When this decision came out of Indiana we all thought it was a bit of a 
joke, and dismissed it, with high and mighty East Coast arrogance, as the 
naïve musings of midwestern know-nothings. But then a marriage challenge 
was filed in New York State and made its way to New York’s highest court, 
and guess what they found? That heterosexual’s irresponsible reproduction 
could justify limiting civil marriage to different sex couples.58  
So morality, in the form of dignity and responsibility, doesn’t obviously 
cut in any predictable direction when it comes to elaborating the civil rights 
of gay men and lesbians. In 1986, moral reasoning in the form of disgust for 
homosexuality justified upholding the criminalization of sodomy. Then, in 
2003, the freedom to enter a relationship and define for one’s self the sweet 
mysteries of life required the overturning of criminal sodomy laws. And in 
2005 in Indiana and 2006 in New York, gay couples could be denied access 
to marriage because they were too responsible in comparison with the 
biologically and ethically challenged heterosexuals who were getting 
pregnant willy-nilly. 
                                                                                                                       
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
56. Id. at 574–75. 
57. Morrison v. Sandler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
58. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006). 
Katherine Franke  11/17/11 10:14 AM
Formatted: Font color: Auto
Katherine Franke  11/17/11 10:14 AM
Formatted: Font color: Auto
Katherine Franke  11/17/11 10:14 AM
Formatted: Font color: Auto
Katherine Franke  11/17/11 10:14 AM
Formatted: Font color: Auto
 
 
 
 
 
43:0000] DIGNIFYING RIGHTS 17 
 
I have to say that I didn’t see any of this coming—moral arguments 
flipping in favor of and then against the civil rights claims of gay people. 
So this brings us to the Prop 8 case in California where morality has 
figured centrally. Of course those who supported Proposition 8, and wanted 
to ban gay marriage, used strong moral arguments that allowing same-sex 
couples to marry would ruin the institution of marriage59 and indeed ruin the 
unions of those straight couples that were now married.60  
The same-sex couples challenging Proposition 8 could have responded 
by meeting the moral arguments of their opposition with a demand that they 
be treated fairly and equally to heterosexual couples who want to marry. 
They could borrow from the race and sex cases, extrapolating from color-
blindness to orientation-blindness. Let’s just think for a moment how this 
would go. There are a few different ways to make the case: 
First, the gay couples could argue that when the state is issuing marriage 
licenses it should do so in a way that does not take the applicants’ sexual 
orientation into account. The state shouldn’t discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation when it issues fishing licenses or drivers’ licenses and 
certainly shouldn’t do so when it issues marriage licenses since all 
applicants, regardless of the sex of their loved one, are similarly situated. 
The sorting of license applicants on the basis of sexual orientation would be 
the issue, not the virtues of the type of license being applied for. We could 
call this the Justice O’Connor, orientation-blind approach, which would be 
grounded in neutral equality principles. 
Or in the alternative, they could argue that the state should not interfere 
in a person’s freedom to choose the person they love as their spouse. Of 
course, we might support some limits on this freedom. As one commentator 
put it: “People do not have a right to marry their dog, their house, their 
refrigerator, July 21, or a rose petal.”61 But the idea here would be that the 
state’s interest is in promoting individual freedom, not in endorsing 
heterosexuality as the official state sexual orientation. This argument would 
derive from a neutral “personal freedom”-based value. 
But that’s not, by and large, how these cases are being argued, or at least 
not how they’re being argued in the first instance. In this new generation of 
                                                                                                                       
59. The Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment, amending the Alabama Constitution 
in 2006, offers a good example: “Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and 
a woman, which, when the legal capacity and consent of both parties is present, establishes their 
relationship as husband and wife, and which is recognized by the state as a civil contract.” ALA. 
CONST., art. I, § 36.03. 
60. Michael T. Schmitt et al., The Role of Heterosexual Identity Threat in Differential 
Support for Same-Sex ‘Civil Unions’ versus ‘Marriages’, 10 GROUP PROCESS & 
INTERGROUP REL. 443, 453 (2007). 
61. Cass Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005). 
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gay rights cases, neutrality is out and morality is in. And it’s really in. The 
trial in the Prop 8 case in San Francisco is a perfect example. The testimony 
by the four plaintiffs, two men and two women, focused primarily on their 
desire for respectability, their longing for the sacred blessing and societal 
recognition that marriage confers, on the fact that being married would be 
better for raising children, and finally on the disgrace of exile from the 
sacred domain of marriage. On top of that, they have argued that the state 
should play a vital role in promoting the institution of marriage and that 
including same-sex couples in the institution would be good for marriage 
more generally. 
When asked by Ted Olsen, one the of the gay couples’ lawyers: “Have 
you encountered instances where because you are not married you were 
placed in embarrassing or awkward situations?” Jeff Zarrillo, one of the 
plaintiffs, testified: “One example is when Paul and I travel, it's always an 
awkward situation at the front desk at the hotel . . . the individual working 
at the desk will look at us with a perplexed look on his face and say, ‘You 
ordered a king-size bed. Is that really what you want?’”62 Or It is always 
certainly an awkward situation walking to the bank and saying, ‘My partner 
and I want to open a joint bank account,’ and hearing, you know, ‘Is it a 
business account? A partnership?’ It would just be a lot easier [to be able to 
say]: ‘My husband and I are here to check into a room. My husband and I 
are here to open a bank account.’”63  
When asked by Mr. Olsen about why they haven’t had children, Mr. 
Zarrillo said: “Paul and I believe that . . . the important step in order to have 
children would be for us to be married. It would make it easier for—for us, 
for our children, to explain our relationship, for our children to be able to 
explain our relationship.”64  
Mr. Olsen then asked Mr. Zarrillo why he and his partner were not 
domestic partners—the California domestic partnership law confers on 
same-sex couples all of the legal and economic benefits of marriage, just 
under a different legal name.65 Zarrillo answered: “we hold marriage in such 
high regard . . . [Domestic partnership would not give] due respect to the 
relationship that we have had for almost nine years. Only a marriage could 
do that.” 66 
                                                                                                                       
62. Transcript of Record at 83–84, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-11-10.pdf. 
63. Id. at 84. 
64. Id. at 81–82. 
65. Id. at 82. 
66. Id. at 82–83. 
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When his boyfriend, partner, hopefully spouse Paul Katami was asked a 
similar question about why marriage was so important to them, he said: “By 
allowing us full access to [the rights and identity of marriage it makes us] a 
full participant as a citizen of our country and our state.”67  
Kris Perry, one of the other plaintiffs, testified in response to Olsen's 
questioning: “the state isn’t letting me feel happy. It’s not letting me 
experience my full potential, because I am not permitted to experience 
everything I might feel if this barrier were removed.”68  
When she was asked about what the institution of marriage meant to her, 
she said:  
So in some ways it’s hard for me to grasp what it would even 
mean, but I do see other people who are married and I—and I 
think what it looks like is that you are honored and respected by 
your family. Your children know what your relationship is. And 
when you leave your home and you go to work or you go out in 
the world, people know what your relationship means. And so then 
everyone can, in a sense, join in supporting your relationship, 
which at this point I can only observe as an outsider.69  
When she was pushed further about what would happen if she and her 
girlfriend were able to marry, Perry described marriage almost like a club 
she was barred from joining.70 She said:  
I think it would be an enormous relief to our friends who are 
married. Our straight heterosexual friends that are married almost 
view us in a way that—I know they love us, but I think they feel 
sorry for us and I can't stand it. You know, many of them are 
either in their second marriage or their first marriage, but 
nevertheless, they have a word and they belong to this institution 
or this group. And I can think of a time recently when I went with 
Sandy happily to a football game at the high school where two of 
our kids go and we went up the bleachers and we were greeted 
with these smiling faces of other parents sitting there waiting for 
the game to start. And I was so acutely aware that I thought, they 
are all married and I'm not.71  
The gist of the plaintiffs’ arguments here is that California has set up a 
segregated system: different sex couples can get married while same-sex 
couples can get domestic partnered. From here, the normative argument 
                                                                                                                       
67. Id. at 116. 
68. Id. at 142–43. 
69. Id. at 142. 
70. Id. at 155. 
71. Id. at 155–56. 
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could go in two different directions. One would point out that the different 
legalization schemes for different-sex and same-sex communicated a 
message of inferiority about or stigmatized the less-favored group—same-
sex couples. The account of discrimination or injury need not “carry a brief” 
for the good being denied same-sex couples. Instead it turned on the fact of 
the different treatment, just as we might with drinking fountains, lunch 
counters or train cars.  
The other direction—one on which the arguments in the marriage cases 
increasingly rely—maintains that not only are same-sex couples being 
treated differently from different-sex couples, they’re being treated worse. 
The emphasis here is on the worse treatment not the different treatment. It’s 
one thing to say the different treatment imposes a badge of inferiority, it’s 
quite another to claim that the two groups are being treated differently and 
one group is getting something wonderful and the other something 
obviously inferior. Like one group’s drinking fountain dispenses 
champagne and the other group is getting water from Lake Erie.  
Here’s where we see a disagreement brewing in the lesbian and gay 
community—about the strategy to treat marriage like champagne and 
domestic partnership or civil unions like water from Lake Erie. The one is a 
social and legal institution that confers legitimacy, respectability and 
dignity to the couples who can get it, and the other brings with it 
illegitimacy, shame and impropriety. In some cases, the same-sex couples 
have gone even further and adopted the argument that marriage is the ideal 
family formation in which responsible reproduction can and should take 
place for both homo and heterosexual couples.  
These are very different approaches to why same-sex couples should be 
permitted to marry—one that disables the state from taking sexual 
orientation into account in the distribution of public licenses and other 
goods, and the other on the blessings conferred from inclusion in a 
fundamentally dignifying institution: marriage. The former invests in a 
principle of neutrality while the latter invests in the dignity of marriage and 
kinds of relationships that are deserving of marriage’s blessings.  
The strategy pursued in the Prop 8 case illustrates well the normative 
turn the gay community has taken in the years since the Bowers defeat. It 
also helps us understand something fundamental about the relationship of 
responsibility to rights to dignity. Lesbian and gay people have mounted a 
ritualized performance of responsibilized citizenship that, over time, was 
used to convince courts and the public that they have put their errant ways 
behind them and/or that they have been horribly misunderstood. It can no 
longer be said that they are promiscuous, value Eros over kinship, are 
unable to form and maintain long-term commitments, and love in dangerous 
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and forbidden ways. Having become recognizable as respectable, the court 
could recognize them as dignified, rights-bearing subjects and equal in rank 
to other (heterosexual) legal citizens.  
Now it may seem odd to be critical of such an important victory for 
lesbian and gay people. What I want us to consider, however, is how the 
judicial conferral of dignity and the recognition of equal rank in a case such 
as this comes at a price. A recognition-based project of this sort provides 
few tools with which to transform or render more just the fundamental 
underlying norms of the institution into which a group seeks inclusion. As 
Judith Butler has observed in another context:  
The problem is not merely how to include more people within 
existing norms, but to consider how existing norms allocate 
recognition differentially. What new norms are possible, and how 
are they wrought? What might be done to produce a more 
egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability?72 
I am concerned that an opportunity has been lost in the same-sex 
marriage cases to expand the social and legal ideal of family beyond a fairly 
traditional model. After all, through history the institution of marriage has 
not been all that great for women. Who better than the lesbian and gay 
community to think more broadly about what it means to love, care for and 
have responsibility for others?  
But even more than that, if these cases are about taking stock of the 
benefits and worth of various family forms, why insist on winning in a way 
that reinforces the vulnerability and illegitimacy of people who do not, or 
cannot, marry? I recall watching the arguments before the Iowa Supreme 
Court in the same-sex marriage case in that state not too long ago. The 
lawyer representing the interests of one of the plaintiffs, a child of one of 
the lesbian couples who could not marry, told a story about how their 
daughter could not enroll in day care because the day care center required 
that the parents of all the children be married. He told the Court that the 
parents should be able to marry so that their child could enroll in the 
center’s program. But it strikes me that the problem with the day care 
center’s policy was not that Iowa prohibited same-sex couples from 
marrying, but that the marital status of the parents was at all relevant to a 
child’s eligibility for child care. Children of married parents and children of 
unmarried parents are similarly situated relative to their qualifications for 
childcare.  
When the Iowa Supreme Court ruled, it found that the state had a 
constitutional obligation to open up marriage to same-sex couples, but it did 
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so for reasons very different from Judge Walker’s opinion in the Prop 8 
case.73 Whereas Walker reinforced a notion that only respectable people 
may marry, and gay people are surely respectable, the Iowa Supreme Court 
steered clear of the kind of moralism grounded in human dignity that we’ve 
seen in so many other Court decisions on this issue. The Iowa court started 
with the state motto, printed on their flag: “Our liberties we prize and our 
rights we will maintain.”74 Building on this notion, the court wrote: “Like 
all Iowans, [the gay and lesbian plaintiffs] prize their liberties and live 
within the borders of this state with the expectation that their rights will be 
maintained and protected—a belief embraced by our state motto.”75 The 
court made every effort to situate the marriage case within the context of a 
time-honored Iowan commitment to treating people equally.76 Whether it 
was a refusal to recognize the legitimacy of slavery in 1839, a recognition 
that racial segregation violated the Iowa Constitution in 1873 long before 
the U.S. Supreme Court did in 1954, or being the first state to grant women 
the right to practice law in 1869, Iowans have had their own strong sense of 
justice and fairness, and as the court noted, “in each of those instances, our 
state approached a fork in the road toward fulfillment of our constitution’s 
ideals and reaffirmed the ‘absolute equality of all’ persons before the law as 
‘the very foundation principle of our government.’”77  
The Iowa court’s approach, based in neutrality and treating similarly 
situated people similarly, is an outlier among the same-sex marriage cases, 
for most courts prefer the thickly normative, dignity-based approach. The 
Iowa Court’s reasoning situates the new gay civil rights as the next step in a 
long tradition of civil rights claims for women and African Americans, and 
it handed a win to gay rights not at the expense of creating a class of sexual 
and domestic outlaws, or ranking forms of human attachment, desire, love, 
kinship and intimacy. 
What is more, the approach the Iowa Court took meant it didn’t have to 
weigh in on the moral worth of marriage as opposed to non-marriage. 
Instead it found that so long as the state is in the marriage business, it must 
make it available to all in a non-discriminatory way. We know how to make 
this argument, it’s the approach being taken in the gays in the military 
cases: you can agree that barring gay men and lesbians from openly serving 
in the military is a kind of discrimination while not necessarily carrying a 
brief for the military. By that I mean, you don’t have to sign up for 
                                                                                                                       
73. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
74. Id. at 872 n.1. 
75. Id. at 872. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 877 (quoting Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 153 (1873)). 
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militarism to appreciate that homosexuals are similarly situated to 
heterosexuals when it comes to military service. What troubles me in the 
marriage context is that many of the parties have taken the view that 
challenging the discrimination in heterosexual-only marriage laws entails 
becoming a congregant in the ministry of marriage.  
* * * 
Toward the end of his paper, Waldron offers a cautionary note: “I can 
imagine that once the responsibility-form for rights is made available . . . 
there may be a temptation by some people to use it in ways that other 
people will want to resist.”78 The example he provides is of pro-life, or anti-
abortion, advocates “arguing that a woman’s right over her body and her 
reproductive capacities is to be understood as a responsibility . . . rather 
than as a pure right of willful choice.”79 I have a different kind of 
consequentialist concern in mind than the one Waldron suggests. Rather 
than worry about how the responsibility-rights form may be put to good use 
by those whose ends I disagree with, I am discomfited by its use by those 
whom I see as allies. Strategies grounded in dignity and responsibility may 
provide a new avenue to secure important rights we have long been denied. 
But they do so at a cost, and a cost not all of us are willing to bear.  
Waldron’s essay challenges us to consider how “some rights actually are 
responsibilities,”80 and that what conjoins right and responsibility, on this 
account, is a foundational commitment to human dignity. Waldron’s 
argument comes off as synchronic in nature: responsibility-rights are an 
expression of the dignity that each person’s humanity entails. But the 
marriage cases tell a different story, one that imposes a different kind of 
temporality into the picture. That temporality is, in important respects, 
redemptive in nature. Collapsing rights into responsibilities without 
unpacking the steps that make those rights “take hold” conceals the degree 
to which an individual’s or group’s dignity is dependent upon and the 
product of the epistemic capacities of others to apprehend that dignity. So 
too, it takes as given the frames that work to differentiate the dignified from 
the depraved, and how those frames operate as a disciplinary set of norms 
that facilitate that recognition. Perhaps most problematically, political and 
legal strategies that tether rights to responsibility are less able to provide the 
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79. Id. 
80. Id. at 1. 
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tools to transform the very norms and conditions that make the equalization 
of rank possible.  
To be sure, Waldron’s thoughtful account of responsibility-rights in the 
Shoen Lecture makes an important contribution to our understanding the 
multiple forms that rights claims can take in liberal society. But as Waldron 
also notes, simply because a particular right is available doesn’t tell us 
anything about whether or not it is a good thing to pull it off the shelf and 
put it to work. That’s where judgment of a different kind must intrude. To 
my judgment, responsibility-rights can be, and often are, won at a cost too 
high to be paid. 
